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iii. Having the course of social reform conform to the collective decisions of the (broadly) Rawlsian reform group of which one is a member.
Finally, I show that free and equal citizens would agree to a general principle for distributing nonideal-theoretic primary goods, and by extension, three corollary principles, each of which takes lexical priority over those that follow. The general principle is:
General Principle of Rawlsian Nonideal Theory: For any class of unjust conditions U, the more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under U, the more goods for (A) causing others to come to have Rawlsian ideals, (B) enabling those who have Rawlsian ideals to weigh those ideals against personal costs, and (C) enabling those who weigh Rawlsian ideals against personal costs to successfully pursue their favored weightings, the members of P ought to enjoy.
The three corollary principles then are:
First Corollary (The Grass-Roots Principle): The more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under nonideal conditions U, the more opportunities the members of P ought to have to participate equitably and effectively in a (broadly) Rawlsian grass-roots social movement.
Second Corollary (The Education Principle): The more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under nonideal conditions U, the more the members of P ought to have the common aim of educating people in: (a) Rawlsian ideals, (b) skills and information relevant to rationally weighing Rawlsian ideals against personal costs, and (c) skills and information relevant to effectively pursuing such weightings.
Third Corollary (The Grass-Roots-Decision Principle): The more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under U, the more the overall course of social reform ought to conform to the collective decisions of grass-roots movements that satisfy the first Two Corollaries.
I aim to show all of this by beginning a long overdue project, one that Rawls once alluded to but which has never been attempted: systematically extending his original position to nonideal theory. Rawls (1999a) alludes to this on p. 216, where he writes that it is only after principles of ideal theory are selected that, -the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy conditions.‖ It will be recalled that strict compliance is one of the stipulations to the original position; the principles of justice are chosen on the supposition that they will be generally complied with. Because the parties are choosing a conception of justice suitable for favorable conditions…the principles [of justice] define then a perfectly just scheme; they belong to ideal theory and set up an aim to guide the course of social reform. But even granting the soundness of these principles for this purpose, we must still ask how well they apply to institutions under less than favorable conditions, and whether they provide any guidance for instances of 8 injustice. The principles and their lexical order were not acknowledged with these situations in mind and so it is possible that they no longer hold.
Political Liberalism are strictly incompatible as a whole (Rawls took
Political
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Rawls also wrote of a method for dealing with this issue:
The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. The first of ideal part assumes strict-compliance and works out the principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable conditions. It develops the conception of a perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of persons under the fixed constraints of human life…Nonideal theory, the second part, is worked out after an ideal conception of justice has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy conditions.
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The implicit idea here -that the original position must be used to determine principles of nonideal theory -follows from two simple ideas. If we assume (a) that justice is fairness, and (b) that the original position models a fair deliberative process, then it is only by (c) applying the original position to nonideal conditions that we determine what is fair (and just) under nonideal conditions. Now, it is hard to say why no one has pursued this project. Rawls thought that nonideal theory might be too complex or muddled to submit to systematic analysis.
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James Woodward, on the other hand, worried that a nonideal theoretic social contract might be self-contradictory. 20 Yet neither actually gave an argument for these views. Although Rawls rejects utilitarianism without referring directly to the original position, his argument can be understood and clarified from that perspective. Consider, once again, the parties' situation. Because they are behind the veil of ignorance, they do not know whose preferences are in fact theirs. If they suppose that every person they could turn out to be (once the veil is raised) wants to be happy above all else, then the parties would maximize their chances of being happy by agreeing to utilitarianism. Rawls rejects utilitarianism, however, because it does -not…take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals.‖ 24 Indeed, while utilitarianism might maximize their chances of being happy, it also gives rise to the distinct possibility that they will end up being someone whose happiness must be sacrificed for the greater happiness of the many. This would be a disastrous result. The parties should therefore aim to avoid the possibility of such sacrifice, if possible. Rawls' answer is that they can avoid this possibility by pursuing -social primary goods‖: basic rights and liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and social props to self-respect. By pursuing these are -all purpose‖ goods, the parties assure themselves that they will be able to successfully pursue their ends no matter who they turn out to be. As Rawls explains, adopting the permissive approach, we are led to principles of nonideal theory that are incompatible with our considered convictions, then perhaps we should revise the procedure, building new restrictions in. All the same, the permissive approach will be shown to justify a compelling general principle of nonideal theory.
It may appear unclear at this point how the parties could proceed in their deliberations if they lack any substantial views about which sorts of personal costs they can legitimately weigh against Rawls' principles and their priority relations. We will discuss this problem later (in §5), but I will say for now that I address it similarly to the way that Rawls tackles an analogous problem within ideal theory: by recourse to primary goods (in our case, nonideal theoretic primary goods). For now, it is important to reiterate how weak the implications of Rawls' ideal-theoretic arguments from A Theory of Justice are for non-ideal theory. Because Rawls entirely idealized away from nonideal conditions, the parties to a nonideal theoretic stage of the original position must all have an equal right to weigh Rawls' principles of ideal theory and their priority relations against whichever personal costs they might face under nonideal conditions. We will now see that Rawls' arguments in Political Liberalism lead to the same conclusion.
§2.2. Political Liberalism
In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that the original position represents our -two moral powers‖ 30 as free and equal citizens: our powers to be rational 31 and reasonable. 32 Rawls claims that these two powers entail that we have three higher-order interests. 33 The first two higher-order interests are derived from the first moral power: rationality. According 
Interest in One's Actual Life Plans). Her first two higher-order interests thus conflict
with the third under nonideal conditions. Must she prioritize the first two over the third?
Given that all three interests are equally founded in her two moral powers, it is hard to see why she must. Having the two moral powers as a free and equal citizen, she should be free to order her higher-order interests as she wishes, provided that her doing so is consistent with the equal right of all other citizens to order their higher-order interests as they wish. But this is identical to the proposition that free and equal citizens in a nonideal theoretic original position all have an equal right to weigh Rawls' principles and priority relations against whichever personal costs they might face under nonideal conditions. This is the conclusion we reached in §2. We saw in §2 that the parties to a nonideal-theoretic original position must (1) have Rawls' principles and priority relations as an aim; and also (2) be free to weigh those principles and priorities against any and every sort of personal cost s/-he might face under nonideal conditions. In order to provide a clearer picture of how the parties should deliberate given these motivations, we must now further describe their deliberative situation -specifically, their situation behind a nonideal theoretic variant of Rawls' -veil of ignorance‖. principles and priority relations. Indeed, the parties should suppose that they could turn out to live under any realistically possible nonideal conditions. This ensures that their deliberations are perfectly general. Whatever principle(s) they agree to will be the principles for dealing with any and every type of injustice. Does this abstract too far? As we will see in §5, then answer is no. The parties can deliberate to a fully general and plausible, principle of nonideal theory from such an abstract position.
Let us now turn to a puzzle that the combination of the parties' motivations and the veil might appear to pose. We have established that the parties must have Rawls' principles and priority relations as an aim, one to weigh against personal costs they might face under nonideal conditions. Now, however, we are imagining them as deliberating about conditions (e.g. a society) in which many people do not have Rawls' principles and priority relations as an aim (nonideal conditions are, after all, conditions in which many people seek to uphold injustice). Accordingly, it appears that the parties simultaneously have one set of motivations, but must deliberate as though they could turn out to be someone who has the opposite motivations. Because no one can simultaneously have and not have a single motivation (that's a contradiction), the nonideal theoretic original position might appear incoherent. However, this contradiction is only an illusion. There are two possible ways of avoiding the incoherence, one of which is superior to the other.
One possibility is to suppose that the parties treat themselves as though they could only turn out to be people who do have Rawls' principles as an aim once the veil is raised. In short, they might rule out the possibility that they could turn out to be any person who favors injustice. This -solution‖, however, does not sit well with a commonsense moral idea. However much we may believe that justice is preferable to injustice, we do not tend to think that people who prefer justice can arbitrarily impose any and every cost they like on people who defend injustice. That is to treat people who prefer justice as something like dictators over the question of how personal costs should be distributed under nonideal conditions. A far more plausible idea is to consider only some interests of unjust people matter: their just interests, or the interests they would have if they accepted the correct principles of justice. This suggests a better solution. The nonideal-theoretic original position is made coherent by imagining the parties -all of whom have Rawlsian ideals and priorities as an aim -as desiring all of the -unjust‖ persons they could turn out to be to (1) come to accept Rawlsian ideals and priorities, thereby (2) giving up whatever unjust or illegitimate preferences they might have. Indeed, this is a commonsensical idea.
Anyone who accepts a particular conception of justice will surely want all -unjust‖ people to stop having unjust ends and instead adopt just ends. 41 The nonideal-theoretic original position, as we have described it, models exactly this. Indeed, there is a simple 41 In nonideal conditions, the unjust stand in our way. Our task is to pursue their, and our, legitimate interests. We model this by having the parties (a) represent all people, and (b) imagining the parties as desiring every person they could turn out to be to have their (the parties') just ends.
way to describe the parties' overall deliberative situation behind the veil of ignorance.
Because the parties to the nonideal-theoretic original position all have Rawls' principles and priority relations as an end, but deliberate behind a veil of ignorance that makes them assume that they could turn out to be a -just‖ or -unjust‖ individual, the parties should can always choose to abstain from participating in a social movement (by simply -staying home‖). Again, the point is not that opportunities to participate in such groups totally eliminate the problem of people facing personal costs they disfavor. The point is that (a) having people on one's side (i.e. being a member of an effective but equitable grassorganization dedicated to Rawlsian ideals), and, (b) having social progress conform to the collective decisions of those on one's side (i.e. conformity to the group's collective decisions), appear to be the two most efficacious ways for any person to shape the course of social progress in a manner that conforms to their favored weighting of Rawlsian 43 Equitably because, behind the veil of ignorance, the parties know they could be -anyone‖ once the veil is raised -in which case they should want every person they could turn out to be to have a real -say‖ over the course of social progress.
ideals against personal costs. Since these two goods qualify as nonideal-theoretic primary goods, the parties to the nonideal-theoretic original position should aim to bestow them on every person they could turn out to be.
It is important to note here that the parties have sufficient reason to prioritize the first of these two goods (the opportunity to participate in an effective but equitable Rawlsian group) over the latter (conformity to a group's collective decisions). After all, the parties should not want social progress to conform to the collective decisions of an inequitable group. Given that the parties could be anyone once the veil of ignorance is raised, the parties should want to ensure that every person they could turn out to be is taken seriously and has an opportunity to have a -say‖ over the costs they will endure for social progress. Thus, from the perspective of the nonideal-theoretic original position, opportunities to participate effectively and equitably in a Rawlsian reform group should take lexical priority over the good of having social progress conform to the decisions of such a group.
We will now see that a third nonideal-theoretic primary good exists -one that takes intermediate priority between these two just discussed. In addition to opportunities to participate equitably and effectively in (Rawlsian) grass-roots groups, the parties should want each group to have a few determinate common aims -aims involving In summation, we have established three nonideal-theoretic primary goods and priority relations between them. These goods are: (i) opportunities to participate equitably and effectively in a Rawlsian grass-roots reform group; (ii) such a group having education in Rawlsian ideals, as well as skills and information relevant to rationally weighing Rawlsian ideals against personal costs, as a common aim (i.e., for themselves and for society at large); and (iii) having social progress conform to the collective decisions of a Rawlsian group that satisfies these conditions (i.e. a group that is not only equitable and effective, but has the aforementioned educational aims as a common end).
The final question is how the parties to a nonideal-theoretic original position should want these goods distributed across society. We now turn to this final issue.
§6. Three Arguments for the General Principle of Rawlsian Nonideal Theory
The final question for us is whether the parties to the nonideal-theoretic original position could come to an agreement on some determinate principle(s) for distributing the nonideal-theoretic primary goods just defended. I will now argue that there are two arguments to be made for the following principle and, by extension, the three corollaries that follow:
General Principle of Rawlsian Nonideal Theory: For any class of unjust conditions U, the more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under U, the more goods for (A) causing others to come to have Rawlsian ideals, (B)
enabling those who have Rawlsian ideals to weigh those ideals against personal costs, and (C) enabling those who weigh Rawlsian ideals against personal costs to successfully pursue their favored weightings, the members of P ought to enjoy.
First Corollary (The Grass-Roots Principle): The more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under nonideal conditions U, the more opportunities the members of P ought to have to participate equitably and effectively in a (broadly)
Rawlsian grass-roots social movement.
Third Corollary (The Grass-Roots-Decision Principle): The more a given population P is unjustly disadvantaged under U, the more the overall course of social reform ought to conform to the collective decisions of grass-roots movements that satisfy the first Two Corollaries. §6.1. The Uniquely Powerful Case for "Maximin" Within Nonideal Theory about Rawls' arguments in ideal theory, so that we can see whether the same objections hold within nonideal theory.
One worry is that the first condition that Rawls adduces in favor of maximin -the claim that there are reasons for sharply discounting probabilities of various outcomes -is not satisfied by the original position. Although Rawls argues against the idea that behind the veil of ignorance, it is rational for the parties to assign an equal probability to every possible result (in accordance with the so-called -principle of insufficient reason‖), several critics have argued it is rational for the parties to reason in such a way.
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Secondly, critics argue that the original position doesn't satisfy the second or third conditions that Rawls defends, at least with respect to the primary goods of income and wealth. 54 For consider again what the second and third conditions are. Rawls claims that maximin is rational when, in addition to discounting probabilities, one cares little about doing better than whatever result maximin assures and one cares very much about avoiding results worse than that which maximin guarantees. As many critics have pointed out, when it comes to economic matters, there seems to be little reason to think that either of these things is true of the parties to the original position. On the one hand, many people the parties could turn out to be once the veil is raised presumably would want to do better than maximin might allow (I might want to be very, very rich, for example, more rich than Rawls' difference principle might allow injustice by definition is something that the parties to the nonideal-theoretic original position cannot tolerate. For the parties are, once again, motivated by principles of ideal theory (within our specific framework, Rawls' principles and priority relations).
Moreover, the worse a given injustice is, the more intolerable the parties should regard those conditions (for again, by definition, the more unjust conditions are, the more those conditions fall short of the parties' own ideals). Rawls' third condition -call it the Intolerability Condition -thus seems satisfied in the nonideal-theoretic case. Now turn to the second condition that Rawls discusses: the question of whether (from the perspective of the nonideal-theoretic original position) the parties have reasons to not care much about doing better than maximin guarantees. In order to evaluate this condition, consider briefly the situation the parties to the nonideal-theoretic original position face: they know that they could turn out to be anyone under nonideal conditions (and that every person they turn out to be should be motivated by Rawlsian ideals).
Every such person they could turn out to be, then, is either (a) unjustly advantaged by injustice in some way, or else (b) unjustly disadvantaged in some way. Now, because they are motivated by Rawls' principles and priorities as an end, the parties should clearly sharply discount the interests (or preferences) of all persons who are unjustly advantaged under nonideal conditions. From their (the parties') point-of-view, these people already enjoy advantages they shouldn't have. The real question then is how to rank outcomes for the unjustly disadvantaged. Now, I submit that there are clear reasons for the parties to adopt -the law of diminishing returns‖ for people who suffer injustice.
Let me explain. It is clear, offhand, that the more a person is disadvantaged by injustice, the more they have to gain (personally speaking) from social reform. A person who is positively oppressed, for example -a slave, for example -surely gains more from being emancipated than, say, the unjustly discriminated against job applicant would gain from no longer being discriminated against. Both are clearly important gains -but clearly, the former gain is far greater than the latter. As a general rule, the more a person is oppressed, the more they have to gain by being empowered to stand up for their just interests with other like-minded people (through the three nonideal-theoretic primary goods defended here). Thus, I submit that Rawls' second condition in favor of maximin (and so, in favor of my General Principle) is well satisfied within nonideal theory.
Finally, there is Rawls' first condition: the supposition that there are compelling reasons to sharply discount probabilities. This condition is also satisfied in the nonidealtheoretic case. Since one does not know precisely which sorts of nonideal conditions one will live in -we did, again, abstract away from particular nonideal conditions and instead have the parties deliberate on the assumption that they could turn out to live under any nonideal conditions -the parties have no reason (at all) to assign a particular probability to outcomes. Moreover, it could be positively disastrous for them to adopt the principle of insufficient reason (the assumption that all outcomes have the same probability) since, as we have just seen, some outcomes (outcomes for those who are the most disadvantaged by injustice) are far more important to the parties than other outcomes (e.g., outcomes for the unjustly advantaged and those who are less unjustly disadvantaged than the worst off).
I propose, therefore, that as open to objections as Rawls' case for maximin may be within ideal theory, the case for maximin is wonderfully powerful within nonideal theory. If this is right -and I believe it is -the parties to the nonideal-theoretic original position ought to agree to the General Principle of Rawlsian Nonideal Theory and its three corollaries. For the General Principle simply is maximin as applied to nonidealtheoretic primary goods, and the three corollaries follow from the General Principle by the priority relations among nonideal-theoretic primary goods defended in §5 of this paper.
§6.2. The General Principle and Corollaries in Reflective Equilibrium
The General Principle of Rawlsian Nonideal Theory coheres with a number of pretheoretic moral intuitions about the idea of -just social progress.‖ It coheres, first, with the simple fact that we celebrate grass-roots social movements (for the correct ideals).
Consider, for example, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. Although it was a monumental struggle, one that involved many costs -police abuse, harassment, Of course, we do not always celebrate grass-roots movement. We have 
Conclusion
We have seen here that Rawlsian nonideal theory has been missing a crucial componentan analysis of transitional fairness -and how to amend this gap. First, we discussed why the original position must be extended to nonideal theory. We then extended the original position to nonideal theory, showing how its parties ought to prioritize a class of nonideal
